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1 Introduction
Causal mediation analysis aims at disentangling a total treatment effect into an
indirect effect operating through an intermediate variable – commonly referred to
as mediator – as well as the direct effect. The latter includes any causal mechanisms
not operating through the mediator of interest. Even when the treatment is random,
direct and indirect effects are generally not identified by simply controlling for the
mediator without accounting for its potential endogeneity, as this likely introduces
selection bias, see Robins and Greenland (1992).
This paper suggests a novel identification strategy for causal mediation analysis
based on changes-in-changes (CiC) as suggested by Athey and Imbens (2006) for
evaluating (total) average and quantile treatment effects. We adapt the approach to
the identification of the direct effect and the indirect effect running through a binary
mediator. The outcome variable must be continuous and is assumed to be observed
both prior to and after treatment and mediator assignment as it is the case in re-
peated cross sections or panel data. The key identifying assumptions imply that the
continuous outcome is strictly monotonic in unobserved heterogeneity and that the
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity does not change over time conditional on
the treatment and the mediator (the latter assumption is also known as stationar-
ity). Given appropriate common support conditions, this permits identifying direct
effects on subpopulations conditional on the treatment and the mediator states, even
if both treatment and mediator assignment are endogenous.
Augmenting the assumptions by random treatment assignment and weak mono-
tonicity of the mediator in the treatment allows for causal mediation analysis in
subpopulations defined upon whether and how the mediator reacts to the treatment.
Specifically, we show the identification of direct effects among those whose mediator
is always one (always-takers in the denomination of Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin,
1996) and never one (never-takers) irrespective of treatment assignment, respec-
tively. Furthermore, we identify the total, direct, and indirect treatment effects on
those whose mediator value complies with treatment assignment (compliers). For
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any set of assumptions, we discuss the identification of both average and quantile
direct and indirect effects. We note that if appropriately weighted, the respective av-
erage effects among compliers, always-takers, and never-takers add up to the average
direct and indirect effects in the population.
Identification in the earlier mediation literature typically relied on linear models
for the mediator and outcome equations and often neglected endogeneity issues, see
for instance Cochran (1957), Judd and Kenny (1981), and Baron and Kenny (1986).
More recent contributions use more general identification approaches based on the
potential outcome framework and take endogeneity issues explicitly into consider-
ation. Examples include Robins and Greenland (1992), Pearl (2001), Robins (2003),
Petersen, Sinisi, and van der Laan (2006), VanderWeele (2009), Imai, Keele, and Yamamoto
(2010), Hong (2010), Albert and Nelson (2011), Imai and Yamamoto (2013), Tchetgen Tchetgen and Shpitser
(2012), Vansteelandt, Bekaert, and Lange (2012), and Huber (2014). The vast ma-
jority of the literature assumes that the covariates observed in the data are suffi-
ciently rich to control for treatment and mediator endogeneity. Also in empirical eco-
nomics, there has been an increase in the application of such selection on observables
approaches, see for instance Simonsen and Skipper (2006), Flores and Flores-Lagunes
(2009), Heckman, Pinto, and Savelyev (2013), Huber (2015), Keele, Tingley, and Yamamoto
(2015), Conti, Heckman, and Pinto (2016), Huber, Lechner, and Mellace (2017), Bijwaard and Jones
(2019), Bellani and Bia (2018), Huber, Lechner, and Strittmatter (2018), and Doerr and Strittmatter
(2019). Comparably few studies in economics develop or apply instrumental variable
approaches for disentangling direct and indirect effects, see for instance Frölich and Huber
(2017), Powdthavee, Lekfuangfu, and Wooden (2013), Brunello, Fort, Schneeweis, and Winter-Ebmer
(2016) and Chen, Chen, and Liu (2017). Our paper provides another, CiC-based
identification strategy that neither rests on selection on observables assumptions
nor on instrumental variables for the treatment or the mediator.
While most studies aim at evaluating direct and indirect effects in the total pop-
ulation, a smaller strand of the literature uses the principal stratification framework
of Frangakis and Rubin (2002) to investigate effects in subpopulations (or principal
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strata) defined upon whether and how the mediator reacts to the treatment, see
Rubin (2004). This approach has been criticized for typically focussing on direct
effects on populations whose mediator is constant (i.e. always- and never-takers)
rather than decomposing direct and indirect effects on compliers and for consider-
ing subpopulations rather than the total population, see VanderWeele (2008) and
VanderWeele (2012). Deuchert, Huber, and Schelker (2017) suggest a difference-in-
differences (DiD) strategy that alleviates such criticisms. Identification relies on a
randomized treatment, monotonicity of the (binary) mediator in the treatment, and
particular common trend assumptions on mean potential outcomes across principal
strata. The latter imply that mean potential outcomes under specific treatment and
mediator states change by the same amount over time across specific subpopulations.
Depending on the strength of common trend and effect homogeneity assumptions
across principal strata, direct and indirect effects are identified for different subpop-
ulations and under the strongest set of assumptions even for the total population.
Our paper contributes to this literature on principal strata effects, but relies on
different identifying assumptions than Deuchert, Huber, and Schelker (2017). While
differential time trends across subpopulations are permitted, our approach restricts
the conditional distribution of unobserved heterogeneity over time. The two sets of
assumptions are not nested and their appropriateness is to be judged in the empirical
context at hand. However, both approaches could be used simultaneously for testing
the joint validity of the identifying assumptions of either method, in which case
both CiC and DiD converge to the same, true average direct and indirect effects.
As a further distinction to Deuchert, Huber, and Schelker (2017), our method also
permits assessing quantile treatment effects (QTEs) rather than average effects only.
In independent work, Sawada (2019) proposes a CiC strategy to tackle non-
compliance in randomized experiments when the exclusion restriction of random
assignment is violated. While there is an overlap in some identification results of
his study and ours (e.g. concerning the direct effect on never-takers), there are
also important differences. First, Sawada (2019) predominantly focusses on the av-
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erage treatment effect on the treated under one-sided non-compliance (ruling out
always-takers), which then corresponds to the total effect on compliers. Our paper
in addition disentangles the total complier effect into direct and indirect compo-
nents. Second, under two-sided non-compliance (i.e. the existence of both never-
and always-takers), Sawada (2019) identifies the total complier effect by assum-
ing homogeneity of the direct effect, while we extend the CiC assumptions to the
always-takers for identifying (direct, indirect, and total) complier effects as well as
the direct effect among always-takers. Third and in contrast to Sawada (2019), we
also provide identification results in the absence of randomization and monotonicity
of the mediator in the treatment. On the other hand, Sawada (2019) in contrast
to our study demonstrates that the CiC strategy does not necessarily require pre-
treatment outcomes, but may exploit any pre-treatment variable that has similar
rank orders (as a function of unobserved heterogeneity) like the outcome of interest.
We provide a simulation study in which we compare the CiC to the DiD approach
to illustrate our identification results. We also consider an empirical application to
the Jobs II programme previously analysed by Vinokur, Price, and Schul (1995), a
randomized job training intervention designed to analyse the impact of job train-
ing on labour market and mental health outcomes. We investigate the direct effect
of the randomized offer of treatment on a depression index, as well as its indirect
effect through actual participation in the programme as mediator. The reason for
investigating the direct effect is that treatment assignment could have a motiva-
tion or discouragement effect on those randomly offered or not offered the training.
We, however, find the direct effect estimates to be close to zero and statistically
insignificant and therefore no indication for the violation of the exclusion restriction
when using treatment assignment as instrumental variable for actual participation.
In contrast, the moderately negative total and indirect effects on those induced to
participate by assignment are statistically significant at least at the 10% level in
all but one case and very much in line with the estimate obtained by instrumental
variable regression.
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The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
notation and defines the direct and indirect effects of interest. Section 3 presents
the assumptions underlying our CiC approach as well as the identification results.
Section 4 provides a simulation study. Section 5 provides an application to Jobs II.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Notation and effects
2.1 Average effects
Let D denote a binary treatment (e.g., receiving the offer to participate in a training
programme) and M a binary intermediate variable or mediator that may be a func-
tion of D (e.g., the actual participation in a training programme). Furthermore, let
T indicate a particular time period: T = 0 denotes the baseline period prior to the
realisation of D and M , T = 1 the follow up period after measuring D and M in
which the effect of the outcome is evaluated. Finally, let Yt denote the outcome of
interest (e.g., health measures) in period T = t. Indexing the outcome by the time
period t ∈ {0, 1} implies that it is measured both in the baseline period and after
the realisation of D andM . To define the parameters of interest, we make use of the
potential outcome notation, see for instance Rubin (1974), and denote by Yt(d,m)
the potential outcome for treatment state D = d and mediator state M = m in time
T = t, with d,m, t,∈ {0, 1}. Furthermore, let M(d) denote the potential mediator
as a function of the treatment state d ∈ {0, 1}. For notational ease, we will not use
any time index for D and M , because either is assumed to be measured at a single
point in time between T = 0 and T = 1, albeit not necessarily at the same point,
as D causally precedes M . Therefore, D and M correspond to the actual treatment
and mediator status in T = 1, while it is assumed that no treatment or mediation
takes place in T = 0.
Using this notation, the average treatment effect (ATE) in the ex-post period
is defined as ∆1 = E[Y1(1,M(1)) − Y1(0,M(0))]. That is, the ATE corresponds
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to the effect of D on the outcome that either affects the latter directly (net of any
effect on the mediator) or indirectly through an effect on M . Indeed, the total
ATE can be disentangled into the direct and indirect effects, denoted by θ1(d) =
E[Y1(1,M(d))− Y1(0,M(d))] and δ1(d) = E[Y1(d,M(1))− Y1(d,M(0))], by adding
and subtracting Y1(1,M(0)) or Y1(0,M(1)), respectively:
∆1 = E[Y1(1,M(1))− Y1(0,M(0))],
= E[Y1(1,M(1))− Y1(1,M(0))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=δ1(1)
+E[Y1(1,M(0))− Y1(0,M(0))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=θ1(0)
,
= E[Y1(1,M(1))− Y1(0,M(1))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=θ1(1)
+E[Y1(0,M(1))− Y1(0,M(0))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=δ1(0)
.
Distinguishing between θ1(1) and θ1(0) or δ1(1) and δ1(0), respectively, implies the
possibility of interaction effects between D and M such that the direct and indirect
effects could be heterogeneous across values d = 1 and d = 0.
In our approach, we consider the concepts of direct and indirect effects within
specific subpopulations. The latter are either defined conditional on the treat-
ment and mediator values or conditional on potential mediator values under ei-
ther treatment states, which matches the so-called principal stratum framework
of Frangakis and Rubin (2002). As outlined in Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996)
in the context of instrumental variable-based identification, any individual i in
the population belongs to one of four strata, henceforth denoted by τ , accord-
ing to their potential mediator status under either treatment state: always-takers
(a: M(1) = M(0) = 1) whose mediator is always one, compliers (c: M(1) = 1,
M(0) = 0) whose mediator corresponds to the treatment value, defiers (de: M(1) =
0, M(0) = 1) whose mediator opposes the treatment value, and never-takers (n:
M(1) = M(0) = 0) whose mediator is never one. Note that τ cannot be pinned
down for any individual, because either M(1) or M(0) is observed, but never both.
Let ∆τ1 = E[Y1(1,M(1)) − Y1(0,M(0))|τ ] denote the ATE conditional on τ ∈
{a, c, de, n}; θτ1(d) and δτ1 (d) denote the corresponding direct and indirect effects.
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Because M(1) = M(0) = 0 for any never-taker, the indirect effect for this group is
by definition zero (δn1 (d) = E[Y1(d, 0)− Y1(d, 0)|τ = n] = 0) and ∆n1 = E[Y1(1, 0)−
Y1(0, 0)|τ = n] = θn1 (1) = θn1 (0) = θn1 equals the direct effect for never-takers.
Correspondingly, because M(1) = M(0) = 1 for any always-taker, the indirect
effect for this group is by definition zero (δa1(d) = E[Y1(d, 1)− Y1(d, 1)|τ = a] = 0)
and ∆a1 = E[Y1(1, 1)− Y1(0, 1)|τ = a] = θa1(1) = θa1(0) = θa1 equals the direct effect
for always-takers. For the compliers, both direct and indirect effects may exist. Note
that M(d) = d due to the definition of compliers. Accordingly, θc1(d) = E[Y1(1, d)−
Y1(0, d)|τ = c] equals the direct effect for compliers, δc1(d) = E[Y1(d, 1)−Y1(d, 0)|τ =
c] equals the indirect effect for compliers, and ∆c1 = E[Y1(1, 1) − Y1(0, 0)|τ = c]
equals the total effect for compliers. In the absence of any direct effect, the indirect
effects on the compliers are homogeneous, δc1(1) = δ
c
1(0) = δ
c
1, and correspond to
the local average treatment effect (LATE, e.g., Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin, 1996).
Analogous results hold for the defiers.
As already mentioned, we will also consider direct effects conditional on specific
values D = d and mediator states M = M(d) = m, which are denoted by θd,m1 (d) =
E[Y1(1, m) − Y1(0, m)|D = d,M(d) = m]. These parameters are identified under
weaker assumptions than strata-specific effects, but are also less straightforward to
interpret, as they refer to mixtures of two strata. For instance, θ1,01 (1) = E[Y1(1, 0)−
Y1(0, 0)|D = 1,M(1) = 0] is the effect on a mixture of never-takers and defiers,
as these two groups satisfy M(1) = 0. Likewise, θ0,01 (0) refers to never-takers and
compliers satisfyingM(0) = 0, θ0,11 (0) to always-takers and defiers satisfyingM(0) =
1, and θ1,11 (1) to always-takers and compliers satisfying M(1) = 1.
2.2 Quantile effects
We denote by FYt(d,m)(y) = Pr(Yt(d,m) ≤ y) the cumulative distribution function
of Yt(d,m) at outcome level y. Its inverse, F
−1
Yt(d,m)
(q) = inf{y : FYt(d,m)(y) ≥ q}, is
the quantile function of Yt(d,m) at rank q. The total QTE are denoted by ∆1(q) =
F−1
Y1(1,M(1))
(q)−F−1
Y1(0,M(0))
(q). The QTE can be disentangled into the direct quantile
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effects, denoted by θ1(q, d) = F
−1
Y1(1,M(d))
(q)−F−1
Y1(0,M(d))
(q), and the indirect quantile
effects, denoted by δ1(q, d) = F
−1
Y1(d,M(1))
(q)− F−1
Y1(d,M(0))
(q).
The conditional distribution function in stratum τ is FYt(d,m)|τ (y) = Pr(Yt(d,m) ≤
y|τ) and the corresponding conditional quantile function is F−1
Yt(d,m)|τ
(q) = inf{y :
FYt(d,m)|τ (y) ≥ q} for τ ∈ {a, c, d, n}. Using the previously described stratifica-
tion framework, we define the QTE conditional on τ ∈ {a, c, de, n}: ∆τ1(q) =
F−1
Y1(1,M(1))|τ
(q)− F−1
Y1(0,M(0))|τ
(q). The direct quantile treatment effect among never-
takers equals ∆n1 (q) = F
−1
Y1(1,0)|n
(q)− F−1
Y1(0,0)|n
(q) = θn1 (q). The direct quantile effect
among always-takers equals ∆a1(q) = F
−1
Y1(1,1)|a
(q) − F−1
Y1(0,1)|a
(q) = θa1(q). The total
QTE among compliers equals ∆c1(q) = F
−1
Y1(1,1)|c
(q)− F−1
Y1(0,0)|c
(q), the direct quantile
effect among compliers equals θc1(q, d) = F
−1
Y1(1,d)|c
(q)− F−1
Y1(0,d)|c
(q), and the indirect
quantile effect among compliers equals δc1(q, d) = F
−1
Y1(d,1)|c
(q)− F−1
Y1(d,0)|c
(q). Finally,
we define the direct quantile treatment effects conditional on specific values D = d
and mediator states M = M(d) = m,
θ
d,m
1 (q, 1) = F
−1
Y1(1,m)|D=d,M(1)=m
(q)− F−1
Y1(0,m)|D=d,M(1)=m
(q) and
θ
d,m
1 (q, 0) = F
−1
Y1(1,m)|D=d,M(0)=m
(q)− F−1
Y1(0,m)|D=d,M(0)=m
(q),
with the quantile function F−1
Yt(d,m)|D=d,M(d)=m
(q) = inf{y : FYt(d,m)|D=d,M(d)=m(y) ≥
q} and the distribution function FYt(d,m)|D=d,M(d)=m(y) = Pr(Yt(d,m) ≤ y|D =
d,M(d) = m).
2.3 Observed distribution and quantile transformations
We subsequently define various functions of the observed data required for the iden-
tification results. The conditional distribution function of the observed outcome Yt
conditional on treatment value d and mediator statem, is given by FYt|D=d,M=m(y) =
Pr(Yt ≤ y|D = d,M = m) for d,m ∈ {0, 1}. The corresponding conditional quantile
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function is F−1
Yt|D=d,M=m
(q) = inf{y : FYt|D=d,M=m(y) ≥ q}. Furthermore,
Qdm(y) := F
−1
Y1|D=d,M=m
◦ FY0|D=d,M=m(y) = F−1Y1|D=d,M=m(FY0|D=d,M=m(y))
is the quantile-quantile transform of the conditional outcome from period 0 to 1
given treatment d and mediator status m. This transform maps y at rank q in
period 0 (q = FY0|D=d,M=m(y)) into the corresponding y
′ at rank q in period 1
(y′ = F−1
Y1|D=d,M=m
(q)).
3 Identification and Estimation
3.1 Identification
This sections discusses the identifying assumptions along with the identification
results for the various direct and indirect effects. We note that our assumptions
could be adjusted to only hold conditional on a vector of observed covariates. In
this case, the identification results would hold within cells defined upon covari-
ate values. In our main discussion, however, covariates are not considered for the
sake of ease of notation. For notational convenience, we maintain throughout that
Pr(T = t, D = d,M = m) > 0 for t, d,m ∈ {1, 0}, implying that all possible
treatment-mediator combinations exist in the population in both time periods. Our
first assumption implies that potential outcomes are characterized by a continuous
nonparametric function, denoted by h, that is strictly monotonic in a scalar U that
reflects unobserved heterogeneity.
Assumption 1: Strict monotonicity of continuous potential outcomes in unob-
served heterogeneity.
The potential outcomes satisfy the following model: Yt(d,m) = h(d,m, t, U), with
the general function h being continuous and strictly increasing in the scalar unob-
servable U ∈ R for all d,m, t ∈ {0, 1}.
Assumption 1 requires the potential outcomes to be continuous implying that there
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is a one-to-one correspondence between a potential outcome’s distribution and quan-
tile functions, which is a condition for point identification. For discrete potential
outcomes, only bounds on the effects could be identified, in analogy to the discus-
sion in Athey and Imbens (2006) for total (rather than direct and indirect) effects.
Assumption 1 also implies that individuals with identical unobserved characteristics
U have the same potential outcomes Yt(d,m), while higher values of U correspond
to strictly higher potential outcomes Yt(d,m). Strict monotonicity is automatically
satisfied in additively separable models, but Assumption 1 also allows for more flex-
ible non-additive structures that arise in nonparametric models.
The next assumption rules out anticipation effects of the treatment or the media-
tor on the outcome in the baseline period. This assumption is plausible if assignment
to the treatment or the mediator cannot be foreseen in the baseline period, such that
behavioral changes affecting the pre-treatment outcome are ruled out.
Assumption 2: No anticipation effect of M and D in the baseline period.
Y0(d,m)− Y0(d′, m′) = 0, for d, d′, m,m′{1, 0}.
Similarly, Athey and Imbens (2006) and Chaisemartin and D’Haultfeuille (2018) as-
sume the assignment to the treatment group does not affect the potential outcomes
as long as the treatment is not yet realized.
Furthermore, we assume conditional independence between unobserved hetero-
geneity and time periods given the treatment and no mediation.
Assumption 3: Conditional independence of U and T given D = 1,M = 0 or
D = 0,M = 0.
(a) U ⊥⊥ T |D = 1,M = 0,
(b) U ⊥⊥ T |D = 0,M = 0.
Under Assumption 3a, the distribution of U is allowed to vary across groups de-
fined upon treatment and mediator state, but not over time within the group
with D = 1,M = 0. Assumption 3b imposes the same restriction conditional on
D = 0,M = 0. Assumption 3 thus imposes stationarity of U within groups defined
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on D and M . This assumption is weaker than (and thus implied by) requiring that
U is constant across T for each individual i. For example, Assumption 3 is satisfied
in the fixed effect model U = η+vt, with η being a time-invariant individual-specific
unobservable (fixed effect) and vt an idiosyncratic time-varying unobservable with
the same distribution in both time periods.
Athey and Imbens (2006) and Chaisemartin and D’Haultfeuille (2018) impose
time invariance conditional on the treatment status, U ⊥⊥ T |D = d, to identify the
average treatment effect on the treated, ϕ1 = E[Y1(1,M(1))−Y1(0,M(0))|D = 1] or
local average treatment effect, ϕ1 = E[Y1(1,M(1))−Y1(0,M(0))|τ = c], respectively.
We additionally condition on the mediator status to identify direct and indirect
effects.
For our next assumption, we introduce some further notation. Let FU |d,m(u)) =
Pr(U ≤ u|D = d,M = m) be the conditional distribution of U with support Udm.
Assumption 4: Common support given M = 0.
(a) U10 ⊆ U00,
(b) U00 ⊆ U10.
Assumption 4a is a common support assumption, implying that any possible value
of U in the population with D = 1,M = 0 is also contained in the population
with D = 0,M = 0. Assumption 4b imposes that any value of U conditional on
D = 0,M = 0 also exists conditional on D = 1,M = 0. Both assumptions together
imply that the support of U is the same in both populations, albeit the distributions
may generally differ.
Assumptions 1 to 3 permit identifying direct effects on mixed populations of
never-takers and defiers as well as never-takers and compliers, respectively, as for-
mally stated in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: Under Assumptions 1–3,
(a) and Assumption 4a, the average and quantile direct effects under d = 1 con-
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ditional on D = 1 and M(1) = 0 are identified:
θ
1,0
1 (1) = E[Y1 −Q00(Y0)|D = 1,M = 0],
θ
1,0
1 (q, 1) = F
−1
Y1|D=1,M=0
(q)− F−1
Q00(Y0)|D=1,M=0
(q).
(b) and Assumption 4b, the average and quantile direct effects under d = 0 con-
ditional on D = 0 and M(0) = 0 are identified:
θ
0,0
1 (0) = E[Q10(Y0)− Y1|D = 0,M = 0],
θ
0,0
1 (q, 0) = F
−1
Q10(Y0)|D=0,M=0
(q)− F−1
Y1|D=0,M=0
(q).
Proof. See Appendix A.
To identify direct effects on further populations, we invoke a conditional inde-
pendence assumption that is in the spirit of Assumption 3, but refers to different
combinations of the treatment and the mediator.
Assumption 5: Conditional independence of U and T given D = 0,M = 1 or
D = 1,M = 1.
(a) U ⊥⊥ T |D = 0,M = 1,
(b) U ⊥⊥ T |D = 1,M = 1.
Under Assumption 5a, the distribution of U is allowed to vary by treatment and
mediator group, but not over time conditional on D = 0,M = 1. Assumption 5b
imposes the same restriction conditional on D = 1,M = 1.
Assumption 6 is similar to Assumption 4, but imposes common support condi-
tional on M = 1 rather than M = 0.
Assumption 6: Common support given M = 1.
(a) U01 ⊆ U11,
(b) U11 ⊆ U01.
Assumptions 6a implies that any possible value of U in the population with D =
0,M = 1 is also contained in the population with D = 1,M = 1. Assumptions
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6b states that any value of U conditional on D = 1,M = 1 exists conditional on
D = 0,M = 1.
Theorem 2 shows the identification of the direct effects on mixed populations of
always-takers and defiers as well as always-takers and compliers.
Theorem 2: Under Assumptions 1-2, 5,
(a) and Assumption 6a, the average and quantile direct effects under d = 1 con-
ditional on D = 0 and M(0) = 1 are identified:
θ
0,1
1 (0) = E[Q11(Y0)− Y1|D = 0,M = 1],
θ
0,1
1 (q, 0) = F
−1
Q11(Y0)|D=0,M=1
(q)− F−1
Y1|D=0,M=1
(q).
(b) and Assumption 6b, the average and quantile direct effects under d = 1 is
identified conditional on D = 1 and M(1) = 1 are identified:
θ
1,1
1 (1) = E[Y1 −Q01(Y0)|D = 1,M = 1],
θ
1,1
1 (q, 1) = F
−1
Y1|D=1,M=1
(q)− F−1
Q01(Y0)|D=1,M=1
(q).
Proof. See Appendix B.
In the instrumental variable framework, any direct effects of the instrument
are typically ruled out by imposing the exclusion restriction, in order to iden-
tify the causal effect of an endogenous regressor on the outcome, see for instance
Imbens and Angrist (1994). By considering D as instrument and M as endogenous
regressor, θ1,01 (1) = θ
0,0
1 (0) = θ
0,1
1 (0) = θ
1,1
1 (1) = 0 yield testable implications of the
exclusion restriction under Assumptions 1-6.
So far, we did not impose exogeneity of the treatment or mediator. In the
following, we assume treatment exogeneity by invoking independence between the
treatment and the potential post-treatment variables.
Assumption 7: Independence of the treatment and potential mediators/outcomes.
{Yt(d,m),M(d)} ⊥⊥ D, for all d,m, t,∈ {0, 1}.
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Assumption 7 implies that there are no confounders jointly affecting the treatment
on the one hand and the mediator and/or outcome on the other hand. It is satis-
fied under treatment randomization as in successfully conducted experiments. This
allows identifying the ATE: ∆1 = E[Y1|D = 1]− E[Y1|D = 0].
Furthermore, we assume the mediator to be weakly monotonic in the treatment.
Assumption 8: Weak monotonicity of the mediator in the treatment.
Pr(M(1) ≥M(0)) = 1.
Assumption 8 is standard in the instrumental variable literature on local average
treatment effects when denoting by D the instrument and by M the endogenous
regressor, see Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996).
It rules out the existence of defiers.
As discussed in the Appendix C, the total ATE ∆1 = E[Y1|D = 1]−E[Y1|D = 0]
and QTE ∆1(q) = F
−1
Y1|D=1
(q)−F−1
Y1|D=0
(q) for the entire population are identified un-
der Assumption 7. Furthermore, Assumptions 7 and 8 yield the strata proportions,
denoted by pτ = Pr(τ), as functions of the conditional mediator probabilities given
the treatment, which we denote by p(m|d) = Pr(M = m|D = d) for d,m ∈ {0, 1}
(see Appendix C):
pa = p1|0, pc = p1|1 − p1|0 = p0|0 − p0|1, pn = p0|1. (1)
Furthermore, Assumptions 2, 7, and 8 imply that (see Appendix C)
∆0,c = E[Y0(1, 1)− Y0(0, 0)|c] = E[Y0|D = 1]−E[Y0|D = 0]
p1|1 − p1|0 = 0. (2)
Therefore, a rejection of the testable implication E[Y0|D = 1]−E[Y0|D = 0] = 0 in
the data would point to a violation of these assumptions.
Assumptions 7 and 8 permit identifying additional parameters, namely the total,
direct, and indirect effects on compliers, and the direct effects on never- and always-
takers, as shown in Theorems 3 to 5. This follows from the fact that defiers are ruled
out and that the proportions and potential outcome distributions of the various
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principal strata are not selective w.r.t. the treatment.
Theorem 3: Under Assumptions 1–3, 7-8,
a) and Assumption 4a, the average and quantile direct effects on never-takers are
identified:
θn1 = θ
1,0
1 (1) and θ
n
1 (q) = θ
1,0
1 (q, 1).
b) and Assumption 4, the average direct effect under d = 0 on compliers is
identified:
θc1(0) =
p0|0
p0|0 − p0|1 θ
0,0
1 (0)−
p0|1
p0|0 − p0|1 θ
1,0
1 (1).
Furthermore, the potential outcome distributions under d = 0 on compliers
are identified:
FY1(1,0)|τ=c(y) =
p0|0
p0|0 − p0|1FQ10(Y0)|D=0,M=0(y)
− p0|1
p0|0 − p0|1cFY1|D=1,M=0(y),
(3)
FY1(0,0)|τ=c(y) =
p0|0
p0|0 − p0|1FY1|D=0,M=0(y)
− p0|1
p0|0 − p0|1FQ00(Y0)|D=1,M=0(y).
(4)
Therefore, the direct quantile effect under d = 0 on compliers, θc1(q, 0) =
F−1
Y1(1,0)|c
(q)− F−1
Y1(0,0)|c
(q), is identified.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Theorem 4: Under Assumptions 1–2, 5, 7-8,
a) and Assumption 6a, the average and quantile direct effects on always-takers
are identified:
θa1 = θ
0,1
1 (0) and θ
a
1(q) = θ
0,1
1 (q, 0).
b) and Assumption 6, the average direct effect under d = 1 on compliers is
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identified:
θc1(1) =
p1|1
p1|1 − p1|0 θ
1,1
1 (1)−
p1|0
p1|1 − p1|0 θ
0,1
1 (0).
Furthermore, the potential outcome distributions under d = 1 for compliers
are identified:
FY1(1,1)|τ=c(y) =
p1|1
p1|1 − p1|0FY1|D=1,M=1(y)
− p1|0
p1|1 − p1|0FQ11(Y0)|D=0,M=1(y),
(5)
FY1(0,1)|τ=c(y) =
p1|1
p1|1 − p1|0FQ01(Y0)|D=1,M=1(y)
− p1|0
p1|1 − p1|0FY1|D=0,M=1(y).
(6)
Therefore, the direct quantile effect under d = 1 on compliers θc1(q, 1) =
F−1
Y1(1,1)|c
(q)− F−1
Y1(0,1)|c
(q) is identified.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Theorem 5: Under Assumptions 1-3, 5, 7-8,
a) and Assumptions 4a, 6a, the total average treatment effect on compliers is
identified:
∆c1 =
p1|1
p1|1 − p1|0E[Y1|D = 1,M = 1]−
p1|0
p1|1 − p1|0E[Q11(Y0)|D = 0,M = 1]
− p0|0
p1|1 − p1|0E[Y1|D = 0,M = 0] +
p0|1
p1|1 − p1|0E[Q00(Y0)|D = 1,M = 0].
Furthermore, the total quantile treatment effect on compliers∆c1(q) = F
−1
Y1(1,1)|c
(q)−
F−1
Y1(0,0)|c
(q) is identified using the inverse of (5) and (4).
b) and Assumptions 4a, 6b, the average indirect effect under d = 0 on compliers
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is identified:
δc1(0) =
p1|1
p1|1 − p1|0E[Q01(Y0)|D = 1,M = 1]−
p1|0
p1|1 − p1|0E[Y1|D = 0,M = 1]
− p0|0
p1|1 − p1|0E[Y1|D = 0,M = 0] +
p0|1
p1|1 − p1|0E[Q00(Y0)|D = 1,M = 0].
Furthermore, the quantile indirect effect under d = 0 on compliers δc1(q, 0) =
F−1
Y1(0,1)|c
(q)− F−1
Y1(0,0)|c
(q) is identified using the inverse of (6) and (4).
c) and Assumptions 4b, 6a, the average indirect effect under d = 1 on compliers
is identified:
δc1(1) =
p1|1
p1|1 − p1|0E[Y1|D = 1,M = 1]−
p1|0
p1|1 − p1|0E[Q11(Y0)|D = 0,M = 1]
− p0|0
p1|1 − p1|0E[Q10(Y0)|D = 0,M = 0] +
p0|1
p1|1 − p1|0E[Y1|D = 1,M = 0].
Furthermore, the quantile indirect effect under d = 1 on compliers δc1(q, 1) =
F−1
Y1(1,1)|c
(q)− F−1
Y1(1,0)|c
(q) is identified using the inverse of (5) and (3).
Proof. See Appendix F.
3.2 Estimation
As in Assumption 5.1 of Athey and Imbens (2006), we assume standard regularity
conditions, namely that conditional on T = t, D = d, and M = m, Y is a random
draw from that subpopulation defined in terms of t, d,m ∈ {1, 0}. Furthermore,
the outcome in the subpopulations required for the identification results of interest
must have compact support and a density that is bounded from above and below as
well as continuously differentiable. Denote by N the total sample size across both
periods and all treatment-mediator combinations and by i ∈ {1, ..., N} an index for
the sampled subject, such that (Yi, Di,Mi, Ti) correspond to sample realizations of
the random variables (Y,D,M, T ).
The total, direct, and indirect effects may be estimated using the sample analogy
principle, which replaces population moments with sample moments (e.g. Manski,
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1988). For instance, any conditional mediator probability given the treatment,
Pr(M = m|D = d), is to be replaced by an estimate thereof in the sample,
∑
N
i=1
I{Mi=m,Di=d}
∑
N
i=1
I{Di=d}
. A crucial step is the estimation of the quantile-quantile trans-
forms. The application of such quantile transformations dates at least back to
Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1991), see also Chaisemartin and D’Haultfeuille (2018),
Wüthrich (2019), and Strittmatter (2019) for recent applications. First, it requires
estimating the conditional outcome distribution, FYt|D=d,M=m(y), by the conditional
empirical distribution FˆYt|D=d,M=m(y) =
1∑
n
i=1
I{Di=d,Mi=m,Ti=t}
∑
i:Di=d,Mi=m,Ti=t
I{Yi ≤
y}. Second, inverting the latter yields the empirical quantile function Fˆ−1
Yt|D=d,M=m
(q).
The empirical quantile-quantile transform is then obtained by
Qˆdm(y) = Fˆ
−1
Y1|D=d,M=m
(FˆY0|D=d,M=m(y)).
This permits estimating the average and quantile effects of interest. Average effects
are estimated by replacing any (conditional) expectations with the corresponding
sample averages in which the estimated quantile-quantile transforms enter as plug-in
estimates. Taking θ1,01 (see Theorem 1) as an example, an estimate thereof is
θˆ
1,0
1 (1) =
1∑n
i=1 I{Di = 1,Mi = 0, Ti = 1}
∑
i:Di=1,Mi=0,Ti=1
Yi
− 1∑n
i=1 I{Di = 1,Mi = 0, Ti = 0}
∑
i:Di=1,Mi=0,Ti=0
Qˆ00(Yi).
Likewhise, quantile effects are estimated based on the empirical quantiles.
For the estimation of total ATE and QTE, Athey and Imbens (2006) show that
the resulting estimators are
√
N -consistent and asymptotically normal, see their
Theorems 5.1 and 5.3. These properties also apply to our context when splitting
the sample into subgroups based on the values of a binary treatment and mediator
(rather than the treatment only). For instance, the implications of Theorem 1 in
Athey and Imbens (2006) when considering subsamples withD = 1 andD = 0 carry
over to considering subsamples with D = 1,M = 0 and D = 0,M = 0 for estimating
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the average direct effect on never-takers. In contrast to Athey and Imbens (2006),
however, some of our identification results include the conditional mediator proba-
bilities Pr(M = m|D = d). As the latter are estimated with √N -consistency, too, it
follows that the resulting effect estimators are again
√
N -consistent and asymptoti-
cally normal. We use a non-parametric bootstrap approach to calculate the standard
errors. Chaisemartin and D’Haultfeuille (2018) show the validity of the bootstrap
approach for such kind of estimators, which follows from their asymptotic normality.
For the case that identifying assumptions to only hold conditional on observed
covariates, denoted by X, estimation must be adapted to allow for control variables.
Following a suggestion by Athey and Imbens (2006) in their Section 5.1, basing
estimation on outcome residuals in which the association of X and Y has been
purged by means of a regression is consistent under the additional assumption that
the effects of D and M are homogeneous across covariates. As an alternative,
Melly and Santangelo (2015) propose a flexible semiparametric estimator that does
not impose such a homogeneity-in-covariates assumption and show
√
N -consistency
and asymptotic normality.
4 Simulations
To shape the intuition for our identification results, this section presents a brief
simulation based on the following data generating process (DGP):
T ∼ Binom(0.5), D ∼ Binom(0.5), U ∼ Unif(−1, 1), V ∼ N(0, 1)
independent of each other, and
M = I{D + U + V > 0}, YT = Λ((1 +D +M +D ·M) · T + U).
Treatment D as well as the observed time period T are randomized, while the
mediator-outcome association is confounded due to the unobserved time constant
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heterogeneity U . The potential outcome in period 1 is given by Y1(d,M(d
′)) =
Λ((1 + d +M(d′) + d ·M(d′)) + U), where Λ denotes a link function. If the latter
corresponds to the identity function, our model is linear and implies a homogeneous
time trend T equal to 1. If Λ is nonlinear, the time trend is heterogeneous, which
invalidates the common trend assumption of difference-in-differences models. M is
not only a function of D and U , but also of the unobserved random term V , which
guarantees common support w.r.t. U , see Assumptions 4 and 6. Compliers, always-
takers, and never-takers satisfy, respectively: c = I{U + V ≤ 0, 1 + U + V > 0},
a = I{U + V > 0}, and n = I{1 + U + V ≤ 0}.
In the simulations with 1,000 replications, we consider two sample sizes (N =
1, 000, 4, 000) and investigate the behaviour of our change-in-changes methods as well
as the difference-in-differences approach of Deuchert, Huber, and Schelker (2017) in
both a linear (Λ equal to identity function) and nonlinear outcome model where
Λ equals the exponential function. To implement the change-in-changes estimators
in the simulations as well as the application in Section 5, we make use of the ‘cic’
command in the qte R-package by Callaway (2016) with its default values.
Table 1 reports the bias, standard deviation (‘sd’), root mean squared error
(‘rmse’), true effect (‘true’), and the relative root mean squared error in percent of
the true effect (‘relr’) of the respective estimators of θn1 , θ
a
1 , ∆c, θ
c
1(1), θ
c
1(0), δ
c
1(1),
and δc1(0) for the linear model. In this case, the identifying assumptions underlying
both the change-in-changes (Panel A.) and difference-in-differences (Panel B.) esti-
mators are satisfied. Specifically, the homogeneous time trend on the individual level
satisfies any of the common trend assumptions in Deuchert, Huber, and Schelker
(2017), while the monotonicity of Y in U and the independence of T and U satisfies
the key assumptions of this paper. For this reason any of the estimates in Table 1 are
close to being unbiased and appear to converge to the true effect at the parametric
rate when comparing the results for the two different sample sizes.
Table 2 provides the results for the exponential outcome model, in which the
time trend is heterogeneous and interacts with U through the nonlinear link func-
20
Table 1: Linear model with random treatment
θˆn1 θˆ
a
1 ∆ˆc θˆ
c
1(1) θˆ
c
1(0) δˆ
c
1(1) δˆ
c
1(0)
A. Changes-in-Changes
N=1,000
bias 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01
sd 0.11 0.08 0.23 0.10 0.13 0.27 0.27
rmse 0.11 0.08 0.23 0.10 0.13 0.27 0.27
true 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00
relr 0.11 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.14 0.27
N=4,000
bias -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01
sd 0.06 0.04 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.14 0.14
rmse 0.06 0.04 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.14 0.14
true 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00
relr 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.14
B. Difference-in-Differences
N=1,000
bias 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00
sd 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.19 0.10
rmse 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.19 0.10
true 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00
relr 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.10
N=4,000
bias -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
sd 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.05
rmse 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.05
true 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00
relr 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05
Note: ‘bias’, ‘sd’, and ‘rmse’ provide the bias, standard deviation, and root mean squared error of
the respective estimator. ‘true’ and ‘relr’ are the respective true effect as well as the root mean
squared error relative to the true effect.
tion. While the change-in-changes assumptions hold (Panel A.), average time trends
are heterogeneous across complier types such that the difference-in-differences ap-
proach (Panel B.) of Deuchert, Huber, and Schelker (2017) is inconsistent. Accord-
ingly, the biases of the change-in-changes estimates generally approach zero as the
sample size increases, while this is not the case for the difference-in-differences esti-
mates. Change-in-changes yields a lower root mean squared error than the respective
difference-in-differences estimator in all but one case (namely δˆc1(0) with N = 1, 000)
and its relative attractiveness increases in the sample size due to its lower bias.
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Table 2: Nonlinear model with random treatment
θˆn1 θˆ
a
1 ∆ˆc θˆ
c
1(1) θˆ
c
1(0) δˆ
c
1(1) δˆ
c
1(0)
A. Change-in-Changes
N=1,000
bias 0.01 -0.14 -0.48 -0.35 -0.11 -0.37 -0.13
sd 0.48 5.08 8.47 6.20 1.16 8.64 4.23
rmse 0.48 5.08 8.48 6.21 1.17 8.65 4.23
true 3.49 68.09 52.42 47.70 4.72 47.70 4.72
relr 0.14 0.07 0.16 0.13 0.25 0.18 0.90
N=4,000
bias -0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.11 -0.07 0.07 0.11
sd 0.25 2.63 4.37 3.20 0.66 4.44 2.04
rmse 0.25 2.63 4.37 3.20 0.66 4.44 2.04
true 3.49 68.09 52.45 47.73 4.72 47.73 4.72
relr 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.14 0.09 0.43
B. Difference-in-Differences
N=1,000
bias -0.27 -8.91 14.42 11.46 -1.49 15.91 2.96
sd 0.46 2.62 2.58 2.62 0.47 2.61 0.47
rmse 0.53 9.29 14.65 11.76 1.56 16.12 2.99
true 3.49 68.09 52.42 47.70 4.72 47.70 4.72
relr 0.15 0.14 0.28 0.25 0.33 0.34 0.63
N=4,000
bias -0.28 -8.79 14.51 11.57 -1.51 16.02 2.94
sd 0.24 1.28 1.26 1.28 0.25 1.27 0.23
rmse 0.37 8.88 14.57 11.64 1.53 16.07 2.95
true 3.49 68.09 52.45 47.73 4.72 47.73 4.72
relr 0.11 0.13 0.28 0.24 0.32 0.34 0.62
Note: ‘bias’, ‘sd’, and ‘rmse’ provide the bias, standard deviation, and root mean squared error of
the respective estimator. ‘true’ and ‘relr’ are the respective true effect as well as the root mean
squared error relative to the true effect.
In our final simulation design, we maintain the exponential outcome model but
assume D to be selective w.r.t. U rather than random. To this end, the treatment
model in (4) is replaced by D = I{U + Q > 0}, with the independent variable
Q ∼ N(0, 1) being an unobserved term. Under this violation of Assumption 7,
complier shares and effects are no longer identified, which is confirmed by the sim-
ulation results presented in Table 3. The bias in the change-in-changes based total,
direct, and indirect effects on compliers do not vanish as the sample size increases.
Furthermore, under non-random assignment of D (while maintaining monotonicity
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Table 3: Nonlinear model with non-random treatment
θˆ
0,1
1 θˆ
1,0
1 ∆ˆc θˆ
c
1(1) θˆ
c
1(0) δˆ
c
1(1) δˆ
c
1(0)
A. Change-in-Changes
N=1,000
bias 0.02 0.13 47.21 40.19 -1.44 48.64 7.02
sd 0.71 4.56 5.45 4.11 0.75 5.53 2.92
rmse 0.71 4.56 47.52 40.40 1.62 48.96 7.60
true 4.41 54.19 52.42 47.70 4.72 47.70 4.72
relr 0.16 0.08 0.91 0.85 0.34 1.03 1.61
N=4,000
bias -0.00 0.06 47.38 40.13 -1.53 48.91 7.25
sd 0.38 2.35 2.84 2.04 0.38 2.86 1.51
rmse 0.38 2.35 47.47 40.18 1.57 48.99 7.40
true 4.40 54.18 52.45 47.73 4.72 47.73 4.72
relr 0.09 0.04 0.90 0.84 0.33 1.03 1.57
B. Difference-in-Differences
N=1,000
bias 0.35 19.98 29.00 27.65 0.04 28.96 1.35
sd 0.67 2.48 2.46 2.48 0.67 2.51 0.45
rmse 0.75 20.14 29.11 27.76 0.67 29.07 1.43
true 4.41 54.19 52.42 47.70 4.72 47.70 4.72
relr 0.17 0.37 0.56 0.58 0.14 0.61 0.30
N=4,000
bias 0.34 20.02 28.98 27.65 0.02 28.96 1.33
sd 0.35 1.22 1.19 1.22 0.35 1.24 0.23
rmse 0.49 20.06 29.01 27.68 0.35 28.99 1.35
true 4.40 54.18 52.45 47.73 4.72 47.73 4.72
relr 0.11 0.37 0.55 0.58 0.07 0.61 0.29
Note: ‘bias’, ‘sd’, and ‘rmse’ provide the bias, standard deviation, and root mean squared error of
the respective estimator. ‘true’ and ‘relr’ are the respective true effect as well as the root mean
squared error relative to the true effect.
of M in D), the never-takers’ and always-takers’ respective distributions of U dif-
fer across treatment. Therefore, average direct effects among the total of never or
always-takers, respectively, are not identified. Yet, θ1,01 , which is still identified by
the same estimator as before, yields the direct effect among never-takers with D = 1
(as defiers do not exist). Likewise, θ0,11 corresponds to the direct effect on always-
takers with D = 0. Indeed, the results in Table 3 suggest that both parameters are
consistently estimated with the change-in-changes model (Panel A.).
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5 Application
Our empirical application is based on the JOBS II data by Vinokur and Price (1999).
JOBS II was a randomized job training intervention in the US, designed to anal-
yse the impact of job training on labour market and mental health outcomes, see
Vinokur, Price, and Schul (1995). It was a modified version of the earlier JOBS pro-
gramme, which had been found to improve labour market outcomes such as job satis-
faction, motivation, earnings, and job stability, see Caplan, Vinokur, Price, and van Ryn
(1989) and Vinokur, van Ryn, Gramlich, and Price (1991), as well as mental health,
see Vinokur, Price, and Caplan (1991). According to the results of Vinokur, Price, and Schul
(1995), the JOBS II programme increased reemployment rates and improved mental
health outcomes, especially for participants having an elevated risk of depression.
The JOBS interventions had an important impact in the academic literature (see
e.g. Wanberg, 2012, Liu, Huang, and Wang, 2014) and the methodology was imple-
mented in field experiments in Finland (Vuori, Silvonen, Vinokur, and Price, 2002,
Vuori and Silvonen, 2005) and the Netherlands (Brenninkmeijer and Blonk, 2011),
suggesting positive effects on labour market integration in either case.
The JOBS II intervention was conducted in south-eastern Michigan, where 2,464
job seekers were eligible to participate in a randomized field experiment, see Vinokur and Price
(1999). In a baseline period prior to programme assignment, individuals responded
to a screening questionnaire that collected pre-treatment information on mental
health. Based on the latter, individuals were classified as having either a high or
low depression risk and those with a high risk were oversampled before the train-
ing was randomly assigned.1 The job training consisted of five 4-hours seminars
conducted in morning sessions during one week between March 1 and August 7,
1991. Members of the treatment group who participated in at least four of the
1In the JOBS II intervention, randomization was followed by yet another questionnaire sent out two
weeks before the actual job training, see Vinokur, Price, and Schul (1995), which also provided
information on whether an individual had been assigned the training. Consequently, the data
collected in that questionnaire must be considered post-treatment as they could be affected by
learning the assignment. Therefore, we rely on the earlier screening data as the relevant pre-
treatment period prior to random programme assignment.
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five sessions received USD 20. Each of the standardized training sessions consisted,
among other aspects, of the learning and practicing of job search and problem-
solving skills.2 The control group received a booklet with information on job search
methods (Vinokur, Price, and Schul, 1995, p. 44-49).
We analyse the impact of job training on mental health, namely symptoms of
depression 6 months after training participation. The health outcome (Y ) is based
on a 11-items index of depression symptoms of the Hopkins Symptom Checklist.
For example, respondents were asked how much they were bothered by symptoms
such as crying easily, feeling lonely, feeling blue, feeling hopeless, having thoughts of
ending their lives, or experiencing a loss of sexual interest. The questions were coded
on a 5-point scale, going from ‘not at all’ (1) to ‘extremely’ (5), and summarized in
a depression variable that consists of the average across all questions.
One-sided non-compliance with the random assignment is a major issue in JOBS
II. While the study design rules out always-takers because members of the control
group did not have access to the job training programme, 45% of those assigned to
training in our data did not participate and are therefore never-takers, the remaining
55% are compliers. In order to avoid selection bias w.r.t actual participation, the
original JOBS II study by Vinokur, Price, and Schul (1995) analysed the total effect
of the policy (i.e. the intention-to-treat effect), including those who, despite receiving
an offer to participate, did not take part in the job training. In contrast, we use our
methodology to separate the direct effect of mere training assignment, which is our
treatmentD, from the indirect effect operating through actual training participation,
which is our mediator M , among compliers.3 We also consider the direct effect on
2When compared to the earlier JOBS programme (Caplan, Vinokur, Price, and van Ryn, 1989),
the job training sessions of JOBS II focused more strongly on building a sense of mastery, per-
sonal control and self- efficacy in job search. Previous research had suggested that an increase in
this sense of mastery, control and self-efficacy improved observed effort in job search behaviour
(Eden and Aviram, 1993). Results in Marshall and Lang (1990) suggest that mastery is a strong
predictor of depression symptoms among women. For a detailed discussion of the literature, the ex-
act sampling process, the training programme, and further aspects, see Vinokur, Price, and Schul
(1995).
3Imai, Keele, and Tingley (2010) analyse Jobs II in a mediation context as well, but consider a
different mediator, namely job search self-efficacy, and a different identification strategy based on
selection on observables.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics on outcomes in pre- and post-mediator periods
pre-treatment (T = 0) post-mediator (T = 1)
sample size mean sample size mean
overall 1,796 1.86 1,564 1.73
(0.58) (0.67)
D = 0 551 1.87 486 1.78
(0.59) (0.70)
D = 1 1,245 1.86 1,078 1.70
(0.57) (0.66)
mean diff 0.01 0.08
pval 0.74 0.03
SD 1.63 11.79
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. ‘mean diff’, ‘pval’, and ‘SD’ are the mean difference,
its p-value, and the standardized difference, respectively.
never-takers, which likely differs from that on the compliers. While being offered
(or not offered) the job training might affect compliers’ mental health by inducing
motivation/enthusiasm (or discouragement), it may not have the same effect among
never-takers, who do not attend such seminars whatsoever.
More concisely, we base identification on Theorem 3a with Assumption 4a for
the average direct effect on never-takers, θn1 , on Theorem 3b with Assumption 4 for
the direct effect on compliers under d = 0, θc1(0), and Theorem 5 with Assumptions
4b and 6a for the indirect effect on compliers under d = 1, δc1(1). None of these
approaches requires the presence of always-takers in the sample. We also note that if
random assignment operated through other mechanisms than actual participation in
any of the subpopulations as it may appear reasonable in the context of mental health
outcomes, this would violate the exclusion restriction when using assignment as
instrumental variable for actual participation in a two stage least squares regression.
Given that our identifying assumptions hold, our approach can therefore be used to
statistically test the exclusion restriction.
Our evaluation sample consists of a total of 3,360 observations in the pre-
treatment and post-mediator periods with non-missing information for D, M , and
Y . It is an unbalanced panel due to attrition of roughly 13% of the initial respon-
dents between the two periods. Table 4 provides summary statistics for the outcome
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in the total sample as well as by treatment group over time. We verify whether ran-
domization was successful by comparing the outcome means of the treatment and
control groups in the pre-treatment period (T = 0) just prior to the randomiza-
tion of D. The small difference of 0.01 is not statistically significant according to
a two sample t-test. Furthermore, the standardized difference test suggested by
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) yields a value of just 1.68 and is thus far below 20, a
threshold frequently chosen for indicating problematic imbalances across treatment
groups. To test for potential attrition bias we also consider these statistics in the
pre-treatment period exclusively among the panel cases that remain in the sample
in the post-mediator period (not reported in Table 4). The p-value of the t-test
amounts to 0.52 and the standardized difference of 3.5 is low such that attrition bias
does not appear to be a concern. We therefore do not find statistical evidence for
a violation of the random assignment of D in our sample. Table 4 also reports the
mean difference in outcomes in the post-mediator period (T = 1) 6 months after
participation, which is an estimate for the total (or intention-to-treat) effect of D.
The difference of 0.08 is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Table 5: Empirical results for Jobs II
Changes-in-Changes Difference-in-Differences Type shares
θˆn1 ∆ˆc θˆ
c
1(0) δˆ
c
1(1) θˆ
n
1 ∆ˆc θˆ
c
1(0) δˆ
c
1(1) pˆ(n) pˆ(c)
est -0.04 -0.11 0.06 -0.17 -0.03 -0.12 -0.06 -0.06 0.45 0.55
se 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.01
pval 0.40 0.06 0.26 0.04 0.52 0.03 0.21 0.43 0.00 0.00
Note: ‘est’, ‘se’, and ‘pval’ provide the effect estimate, standard error, and p-value of the respective
estimator. pˆ(n) and pˆ(c) are the estimated never-taker and complier shares. Standard errors are
based on cluster bootstrapping the effects 1999 times where clustering is on the respondent level.
Table 5 presents the estimation results based on our CiC approach and the DiD
strategy of Deuchert, Huber, and Schelker (2017) when (linearly) controlling for the
gender of respondents in either case. Standard errors rely on cluster bootstrapping
the direct and indirect effects 1999 times, where clustering is on the respondent
level. The CiC and DiD estimates of the direct effects on never-takers, θˆn1 (0), as
well as on compliers, θˆc1(0), are not statistically significant at conventional levels.
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Hence, we do not find statistical evidence for a direct effect of the mere assignment
into the training programme on the depression outcome, which would point to a
violation of the exclusion restriction when using assignment as instrument for par-
ticipation. In contrast, we find for both CiC and DiD negative total effects among
compliers ∆ˆc that are statistically significant at least at the 10% level. In the case
of CiC, also the negative indirect effect among compliers, δˆc1(1), is significant at the
5% level, while this is not in the case for DiD. By and large, our results point to a
moderately negative treatment effect on depressive symptoms through actual pro-
gramme participation, rather than through other (i.e. direct) mechanisms. The CiC
estimates δˆc1(1) and ∆ˆc are in fact rather similar to the result of a two stage least
squares regression relying on the exclusion restriction by using D as instrument for
M . The latter approach yields a local average treatment effect on compliers in the
post-mediator period of -0.14 with a heteroskedasticity-robust standard error of 0.07
(significant at the 5% level).
6 Conclusion
We proposed a novel identification strategy for causal mediation analysis with re-
peated cross sections or panel data based on changes-in-changes (CiC) assump-
tions that are related but yet different to Athey and Imbens (2006) considering to-
tal treatment effects. Strict monotonicity of outcomes in unobserved heterogeneity
and distributional time invariance of the latter within groups defined on treatment
and mediator states are key assumptions for identifying direct effects within these
groups. Additionally assuming random treatment assignment and weak monotonic-
ity of the mediator in the treatment permits identifying direct effects on never-takers
and always-takers as well as total, direct, and indirect effects on compliers. We also
provided a brief simulation study and an empirical application to the Jobs II pro-
gramme.
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Appendices
A Proof of Theorem 1
A.1 Average direct effect under d = 1 conditional on D = 1
and M(1) = 0
In the following, we prove that θ1,01 (1) = E[Y1(1, 0) − Y1(0, 0)|D = 1,Mi(1) =
0] = E[Y1 − Q00(Y0)|D = 1,M = 0]. Using the observational rule, we obtain
E[Y1(1, 0)|D = 1,M(1) = 0] = E[Y1|D = 1,M = 0]. Accordingly, we have to show
that E[Y1(0, 0)|D = 1,M(1) = 0] = E[Q00(Y0)|D = 1,M = 0] to finish the proof.
Denote the inverse of h(d,m, t, u) by h−1(d,m, t; y), which exists because of the
strict monotonicity required in Assumption 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 3a, the
conditional potential outcome distribution function equals
FYt(d,0)|D=1,M=0(y)
A1
= Pr(h(d,m, t, U) ≤ y|D = 1,M = 0, T = t),
= Pr(U ≤ h−1(d,m, t; y)|D = 1,M = 0, T = t),
A3a
= Pr(U ≤ h−1(d,m, t; y)|D = 1,M = 0),
= FU |10(h
−1(d,m, t; y)),
(A.1)
for d, d′ ∈ {0, 1}. We use these quantities in the following.
First, evaluating FY1(0,0)|D=1,M=0(y) at h(0, 0, 1, u) gives
FY1(0,0)|D=1,M=0(h(0, 0, 1, u)) = FU |10(h
−1(0, 0, 1; h(0, 0, 1, u))) = FU |10(u).
Applying F−1
Y1(0,0)|D=1,M=0
(q) to both sides, we have
h(0, 0, 1, u) = F−1
Y1(0,0)|D=1,M=0
(FU |10(u)). (A.2)
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Second, for FY0(0,0)|D=1,M=0(y) we have
F−1
U |D=1,M=0(FY0(0,0)|D=1,M=0(y)) = h
−1(0, 0, 0; y). (A.3)
Combining (A.2) and (A.3) yields,
h(0, 0, 1, h−1(0, 0, 0; y)) = F−1
Y1(0,0)|D=1,M=0
◦ FY0(0,0)|D=1,M=0(y). (A.4)
Note that h(0, 0, 1, h−1(0, 0, 0; y)) maps the period 1 (potential) outcome of an in-
dividual with the outcome y in period 0 under non-treatment without the me-
diator. Accordingly, E[F−1
Y1(0,0)|D=1,M=0
◦ FY0(0,0)|D=1,M=0(Y0)|D = 1,M = 0] =
E[Y1(0, 0)|D = 1,M = 0]. We can identify FY0(0,0)|D=1,M=0(y) under Assump-
tion 2, but we cannot identify FY1(0,0)|D=1,M=0(y). However, we show in the fol-
lowing that we can identify the overall quantile-quantile transform F−1
Y1(0,0)|D=1,M=0
◦
FY0(0,0)|D=1,M=0(y) under the additional Assumption 3b.
Under Assumptions 1 and 3b, the conditional potential outcome distribution
function equals
FYt(d,0)|D=0,M=0(y)
A1
= Pr(h(d,m, t, U) ≤ y|D = 0,M = 0, T = t),
= Pr(U ≤ h−1(d,m, t; y)|D = 0,M = 0, T = t),
A3b
= Pr(U ≤ h−1(d,m, t; y)|D = 0,M = 0),
= FU |00(h
−1(d,m, t; y)),
(A.5)
for d, d′ ∈ {0, 1}. We repeat similar steps as above. First, evaluating FY1(0,0)|D=0,M=0(y)
at h(0, 0, 1, u) gives
FY1(0,0)D=0,M=0(h(0, 0, 1, u)) = FU |00(h
−1(0, 0, 1; h(0, 0, 1, u))) = FU |00(u).
Applying F−1
Y1(0,0)|D=0,M=0
(q) to both sides, we have
h(0, 0, 1, u) = F−1
Y1(0,0)|D=0,M=0
(FU |00(u)). (A.6)
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Second, for FY0(0,0)|D=0,M=0(y) we have
F−1
U |00(FY0(0,0)|D=0,M=0(y)) = h
−1(0, 0, 0; y). (A.7)
Combining (A.6) and (A.7) yields,
h(0, 0, 1, h−1(0, 0, 0; y)) = F−1
Y1(0,0)|D=0,M=0
◦ FY0(0,0)|D=0,M=0(y). (A.8)
The left sides of (A.4) and (A.8) are equal. In contrast to (A.4), (A.8) con-
tains only distributions that can be identified from observable data. In partic-
ular, FYt(0,0)|D=0,M=0(y) = Pr(Yt(0, 0) ≤ y|D = 0,M = 0) = Pr(Yt ≤ y|D =
0,M = 0). Accordingly, we can identify F−1
Y1(0,0)|D=1,M=0
◦ FY0(0,0)|D=1,M=0(y) by
Q00(y) ≡ F−1Y1|D=0,M=0 ◦ FY0|D=0,M=0(y).
Parsing Y0 through Q00(·) in the treated group without mediator gives
E[Q00(Y0)|D = 1,M = 0]
= E[F−1
Y1|D=0,M=0
◦ FY0|D=0,M=0(Y0)|D = 1,M = 0],
= E[F−1
Y1(0,0)|D=0,M=0
◦ FY0(0,0)|D=0,M=0(Y0(1, 0))|D = 1,M = 0],
A1,A3b
= E[h(0, 0, 1, h−1(0, 0, 0; Y0(1, 0)))|D = 1,M = 0],
A2
= E[h(0, 0, 1, h−1(0, 0, 0; Y0(0, 0)))|D = 1,M = 0],
A1,A3a
= E[F−1
Y1(0,0)|D=1,M=0
◦ FY0(0,0)|D=1,M=0(Y0(0, 0))|D = 1,M = 0],
= E[Y1(0, 0)|D = 1,M = 0] = E[Y1(0, 0)|D = 1,M(1) = 0],
(A.9)
which has data support because of Assumption 4a.
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A.2 Quantile direct effect under d = 1 conditional on D = 1
and M(1) = 0
In the following, we prove that
θ
1,0
1 (q, 1) = F
−1
Y1(1,0)|D=1,M(1)=0
(q)− F−1
Y1(0,0)|D=1,M(1)=0
(q),
= F−1
Y1|D=1,M=0
(q)− F−1
Q00(Y0)|D=1,M=0
(q).
For this purpose, we have to show that
FY1(1,0)|D=1,M(1)=0(y) = FY1|D=1,M=0(y) and (A.10)
FY1(0,0)|D=1,M(1)=0(y) = FQ00(Y0)|D=1,M=0(y), (A.11)
which is sufficient to show that the quantiles are also identified. We can show (A.10)
using the observational rule FY1(1,0)|D=1,M(1)=0(y) = FY1|D=1,M=0(y) = E[1{Y1 ≤
y}|D = 1,M = 0], with 1{·} being the indicator function.
Using (A.9), we obtain
FQ00(Y0)|D=1,M=0(y)
= E[1{Q00(Y0) ≤ y}|D = 1,M = 0],
= E[1{F−1
Y1|D=0,M=0
◦ FY0|D=0,M=0(Y0) ≤ y}|D = 1,M = 0],
= E[1{Y1(0, 0) ≤ y}|D = 1,M = 0],
= FY1(0,0)|D=1,M(1)=0(y),
(A.12)
which proves (A.11).
A.3 Average direct effect under d = 0 conditional on D = 0
and M(0) = 0
In the following, we show that θ0,01 (0) = E[Y1(1, 0) − Y1(0, 0)|D = 0,M(0) =
0] = E[Q10(Y0) − Y1|D = 0,M = 0]. Using the observational rule, we obtain
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E[Y1(0, 0)|D = 0,M(0) = 0] = E[Y1|D = 0,M = 0]. Accordingly, we have to show
that E[Y1(1, 0)|D = 0,M(0) = 0] = E[Q10(Y0)|D = 0,M = 0] to finish the proof.
First, we use (A.5) to evaluate FY1(1,0)|D=0,M=0(y) at h(1, 0, 1, u)
FY1(1,0)|D=0,M=0(h(1, 0, 1, u)) = FU |10(h
−1(1, 0, 1; h(1, 0, 1, u))) = FU |10(u).
Applying F−1
Y1(1,0)|D=0,M=0
(q) to both sides, we have
h(1, 0, 1, u) = F−1
Y1(1,0)|D=0,M=0
(FU |10(u)). (A.13)
Second, for FY0(1,0)|D=0,M=0(y) we have
F−1
U |10(FY0(1,0)|D=0,M=0(y)) = h
−1(1, 0, 0; y), (A.14)
using (A.5). Combining (A.13) and (A.14) yields,
h(1, 0, 1, h−1(1, 0, 0; y)) = F−1
Y1(1,0)|D=0,M=0
◦ FY0(1,0)|D=0,M=0(y). (A.15)
Note that h(1, 0, 1, h−1(1, 0, 0; y)) maps the period 1 (potential) outcome of an indi-
vidual with the outcome y in period 0 under treatment without the mediator. Ac-
cordingly, E[F−1
Y1(1,0)|D=0,M=0
◦ FY0(1,0)|D=0,M=0(Y0)|D = 0,M = 0] = E[Y1(1, 0)|D =
1,M = 0]. We can identify FY0(1,0)|D=0,M=0(y) under Assumption 2, but we cannot
identify FY1(1,0)|D=0,M=0(y). However, we show in the following that we can identify
the overall quantile-quantile transform F−1
Y1(1,0)|D=0,M=0
◦FY0(1,0)|D=0,M=0(y) under the
additional Assumption 3a.
First, we use (A.1) to evaluate FY1(1,0)|D=1,M=0(y) at h(1, 0, 1, u)
FY1(1,0)|D=10,M=0(h(1, 0, 1, u)) = FU |10(h
−1(1, 0, 1; h(1, 0, 1, u))) = FU |10(u).
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Applying F−1
Y1(1,0)|D=1,M=0
(q) to both sides, we have
h(1, 0, 1, u) = F−1
Y1(1,0)|D=1,M=0
(FU |10(u)). (A.16)
Second, for FY0(1,0)|D=0,M=0(y) we have
F−1
U |10(FY0(1,0)|D=1,M=0(y)) = h
−1(1, 0, 0; y), (A.17)
using (A.1). Combining (A.16) and (A.17) yields,
h(1, 0, 1, h−1(1, 0, 0; y)) = F−1
Y1(1,0)|D=1,M=0
◦ FY0(1,0)|D=1,M=0(y). (A.18)
The left sides of (A.15) and (A.18) are equal. In contrast to (A.15), (A.18) con-
tains only distributions that can be identified from observable data. In partic-
ular, FYt(1,0)|D=1,M=0(y) = Pr(Yt(1, 0) ≤ y|D = 1,M = 0) = Pr(Yt ≤ y|D =
1,M = 0). Accordingly, we can identify F−1
Y1(1,0)|D=0,M=0
◦ FY0(1,0)|D=0,M=0(y) by
Q10(y) ≡ F−1Y1|D=1,M=0 ◦ FY0|D=1,M=0(y).
Parsing Y0 through Q10(·) in the non-treated group without mediator gives
E[Q10(Y0)|D = 0,M = 0]
= E[F−1
Y1|D=1,M=0
◦ FY0|D=1,M=0(Y0)|D = 0,M = 0],
= E[F−1
Y1(1,0)|D=1,M=0
◦ FY0(1,0)|D=1,M=0(Y0(0, 0))|D = 0,M = 0],
A1,A3a
= E[h(1, 0, 1, h−1(1, 0, 0; Y0(0, 0)))|D = 0,M = 0],
A2
= E[h(1, 0, 1, h−1(1, 0, 0; Y0(1, 0)))|D = 1,M = 0],
A1,A3b
= E[F−1
Y1(1,0)|D=0,M=0
◦ FY0(1,0)|D=0,M=0(Y0(1, 0))|D = 0,M = 0],
= E[Y1(1, 0)|D = 0,M = 0] = E[Y1(1, 0)|D = 0,M(0) = 0],
(A.19)
which has data support because of Assumption 4b.
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A.4 Quantile direct effect under d = 0 conditional on D = 0
and M(0) = 0
In the following, we prove that
θ
0,0
1 (q, 0) = F
−1
Y1(1,0)|D=0,M(0)=0
(q)− F−1
Y1(0,0)|D=0,M(0)=0
(q),
= F−1
Q10(Y0)|D=0,M=0
(q)− F−1
Y1|D=0,M=0
(q).
For this purpose, we have to show that
FY1(1,0)|D=0,M(0)=0(y) = FQ10(Y0)|D=0,M=0(y) and (A.20)
FY1(0,0)|D=0,M(0)=0(y) = FY1|D=0,M=0(y), (A.21)
which is sufficient to show that the quantiles are also identified. We can show (A.21)
using the observational rule FY1(0,0)|D=0,M(0)=0(y) = FY1|D=0,M=0(y) = E[1{Y1 ≤
y}|D = 0,M = 0].
Using (A.19), we obtain
FQ10(Y0)|D=0,M=0(y)
= E[1{Q10(Y0) ≤ y}|D = 0,M = 0],
= E[1{F−1
Y1|D=1,M=0
◦ FY0|D=1,M=0(Y0) ≤ y}|D = 0,M = 0],
= E[1{Y1(1, 0) ≤ y}|D = 0,M = 0],
= FY1(1,0)|D=0,M(0)=0(y),
which proves (A.20).
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B Proof of Theorem 2
B.1 Average direct effect under d = 0 conditional on D = 0
and M(0) = 1
In the following, we show that θ0,11 (0) = E[Y1(1, 1) − Y1(0, 1)|D = 0,M(0) =
1] = E[Q11(Y0) − Y1|D = 0,M = 1]. Using the observational rule, we obtain
E[Y1(0, 1)|D = 0,M(0) = 1] = E[Y1|D = 0,M = 1]. Accordingly, we have to show
that E[Y1(1, 1)|D = 0,M(0) = 1] = E[Q11(Y0)|D = 0,M = 1] to finish the proof.
Under Assumptions 1 and 5a, the conditional potential outcome distribution
function equals
FYt(d,0)|D=1,M=0(y)
A1
= Pr(h(d,m, t, U) ≤ y|D = 0,M = 1, T = t),
= Pr(U ≤ h−1(d,m, t; y)|D = 0,M = 1, T = t),
A5a
= Pr(U ≤ h−1(d,m, t; y)|D = 0,M = 1),
= FU |01(h
−1(d,m, t; y)),
(B.1)
for d, d′ ∈ {0, 1}. We use these quantities in the following.
First, evaluating FY1(1,1)|D=0,M=1(y) at h(1, 1, 1, u) gives
FY1(1,1)|D=0,M=1(h(1, 1, 1, u)) = FU |01(h
−1(1, 1, 1; h(1, 1, 1, u))) = FU |01(u).
Applying F−1
Y1(1,1)|D=0,M=1
(q) to both sides, we have
h(1, 1, 1, u) = F−1
Y1(1,1)|D=0,M=1
(FU |01(u)). (B.2)
Second, for FY0(1,1)|D=0,M=1(y) we have
F−1
U |01(FY0(1,1)|D=0,M=1(y)) = h
−1(1, 1, 0; y). (B.3)
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Combining (B.2) and (B.3) yields,
h(1, 1, 1, h−1(1, 1, 0; y)) = F−1
Y1(1,1)|D=0,M=1
◦ FY0(1,1)|D=0,M=1(y). (B.4)
Note that h(1, 1, 1, h−1(1, 1, 0; y)) maps the period 1 (potential) outcome of an in-
dividual with the outcome y in period 0 under treatment with the mediator. Ac-
cordingly, E[F−1
Y1(1,1)|D=0,M=1
◦ FY0(1,1)|D=0,M=1(Y0)|D = 0,M = 1] = E[Y1(1, 1)|D =
0,M = 1]. We can identify FY0(1,1)|D=0,M=1(y) = FY0|D=0,M=1(y) under Assump-
tion 2, but we cannot identify FY1(1,1)|D=0,M=1(y). However, we show in the follow-
ing that we can identify the overall quantile-quantile transform F−1
Y1(1,1)|D=0,M=1
◦
FY0(1,1)|D=0,M=1(y) under the additional Assumption 5b.
Under Assumptions 1 and 5b, the conditional potential outcome distribution
function equals
FYt(d,1)|D=1,M=1(y)
A1
= Pr(h(d,m, t, U) ≤ y|D = 1,M = 1, T = t),
= Pr(U ≤ h−1(d,m, t; y)|D = 1,M = 1, T = t),
A5b
= Pr(U ≤ h−1(d,m, t; y)|D = 1,M = 1),
= FU |11(h
−1(d,m, t; y)),
(B.5)
for d, d′ ∈ {0, 1}. We repeat similar steps as above. First, evaluating FY1(1,1)|D=1,M=1(y)
at h(1, 1, 1, u) gives
FY1(1,1)|D=1,M=1(h(1, 1, 1, u)) = FU |11(h
−1(1, 1, 1; h(1, 1, 1, u))) = FU |11(u).
Applying F−1
Y1(1,1)|D=1,M=1
(q) to both sides, we have
h(1, 1, 1, u) = F−1
Y1(1,1)|D=1,M=1
(FU |11(u)). (B.6)
Second, for FY0(1,1)|D=1,M=1(y) we have
F−1
U |11(FY0(1,1)|D=1,M=1(y)) = h
−1(1, 1, 1; y). (B.7)
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Combining (B.6) and (B.7) yields,
h(1, 1, 1, h−1(1, 1, 0; y)) = F−1
Y1(1,1)|D=1,M=1
◦ FY0(1,1)|D=1,M=1(y). (B.8)
The left sides of (B.4) and (B.8) are equal. In contrast to (B.4), (B.8) con-
tains only distributions that can be identified from observable data. In partic-
ular, FYt(1,1)|D=1,M=1(y) = Pr(Yt(1, 1) ≤ y|D = 1,M = 1) = Pr(Yt ≤ y|D =
1,M = 1). Accordingly, we can identify F−1
Y1(1,1)|D=0,M=1
◦ FY0(1,1)|D=0,M=1(y) by
Q11(y) ≡ F−1Y1|D=1,M=1 ◦ FY0|D=1,M=1(y).
Parsing Y0 through Q11(·) in the non-treated group with mediator gives
E[Q11(Y0)|D = 0,M = 1]
= E[F−1
Y1|D=1,M=1
◦ FY0|D=1,M=1(Y0)|D = 0,M = 1],
= E[F−1
Y1(1,1)|D=1,M=1
◦ FY0(1,1)|D=1,M=1(Y0(0, 1))|D = 0,M = 1],
A1,A5b
= E[h(1, 1, 1, h−1(1, 1, 0; Y0(0, 1)))|D = 0,M = 1],
A2
= E[h(1, 1, 1, h−1(1, 1, 0; Y0(0, 0)))|D = 0,M = 1],
A1,A5a
= E[F−1
Y1(1,1)|D=0,M=1
◦ FY0(1,1)|D=0,M=1(Y0(0, 0))|D = 0,M = 1],
= E[Y1(1, 1)|D = 0,M = 1] = E[Y1(1, 1)|D = 0,M(0) = 1],
(B.9)
which has data support because of Assumption 6a.
B.2 Quantile direct effect under d = 0 conditional on D = 0
and M(0) = 1
In the following, we show that
θ
0,1
1 (q, 0) = F
−1
Y1(1,1)|D=0,M(0)=1
(q)− F−1
Y1(0,1)|D=0,M(0)=1
(q),
= F−1
Q11(Y0)|D=0,M=1
(q)− F−1
Y1|D=0,M=1
(q).
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For this purpose, we have to prove that
FY1(1,1)|D=0,M(0)=1(y) = FQ11(Y0)|D=0,M=1(y) and (B.10)
FY1(0,1)|D=0,M(0)=1(y) = FY1|D=0,M=1(y), (B.11)
which is sufficient to show that the quantiles are also identified. We can show (B.11)
using the observational rule FY1(0,1)|D=0,M(0)=1(y) = FY1|D=0,M=1(y) = E[1{Y1 ≤
y}|D = 0,M = 1].
Using (B.9), we obtain
FQ11(Y0)|D=0,M=1(y)
= E[1{Q11(Y0) ≤ y}|D = 0,M = 1],
= E[1{F−1
Y1|D=1,M=1
◦ FY0|D=1,M=1(Y0) ≤ y}|D = 0,M = 1],
= E[1{Y1(1, 1) ≤ y}|D = 0,M = 0],
= FY1(1,1)|D=0,M(0)=1(y),
(B.12)
which proves (B.10).
B.3 Average direct effect under d = 1 conditional on D = 1
and M(1) = 1
In the following, we show that θ1,11 (1) = E[Y1(1, 1) − Y1(0, 1)|D = 1,M(1) =
1] = E[Y1 − Q01(Y0)|D = 1,M = 1]. Using the observational rule, we obtain
E[Y1(1, 1)|D = 1,M(1) = 1] = E[Y1|D = 1,M = 1]. Accordingly, we have to show
that E[Y1(0, 1)|D = 1,M(1) = 1] = E[Q01(Y0)|D = 1,M = 1] to finish the proof.
First, using (B.5) to evaluate FY1(0,1)|D=1,M=1(y) at h(0, 1, 1, u) gives
FY1(0,1)|D=1,M=1(h(0, 1, 1, u)) = FU |11(h
−1(0, 1, 1; h(0, 1, 1, u))) = FU |11(u).
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Applying F−1
Y1(0,1)|D=1,M=1
(q) to both sides, we have
h(0, 1, 1, u) = F−1
Y1(0,1)|D=1,M=1
(FU |11(u)). (B.13)
Second, for FY0(0,1)|D=0,M=1(y) we obtain
F−1
U |11(FY0(0,1)|D=1,M=1(y)) = h
−1(0, 1, 0; y), (B.14)
using (B.5). Combining (B.13) and (B.14) yields,
h(0, 1, 1, h−1(0, 1, 0; y)) = F−1
Y1(0,1)|D=1,M=1
◦ FY0(0,1)|D=1,M=1(y). (B.15)
Note that h(0, 1, 1, h−1(0, 1, 0; y)) maps the period 1 (potential) outcome of an indi-
vidual with the outcome y in period 0 under non-treatment with the mediator. Ac-
cordingly, E[F−1
Y1(1,1)|D=0,M=1
◦ FY0(1,1)|D=0,M=1(Y0)|D = 0,M = 1] = E[Y1(1, 1)|D =
0,M = 1]. We can identify FY0(1,1)|D=0,M=1(y) = FY0|D=0,M=1(y) under Assump-
tion 2, but we cannot identify FY1(1,1)|D=0,M=1(y). However, we show in the follow-
ing that we can identify the overall quantile-quantile transform F−1
Y1(1,1)|D=0,M=1
◦
FY0(1,1)|D=0,M=1(y) under the additional Assumption 5a.
First, using (B.1) to evaluate FY1(0,1)|D=0,M=1(y) at h(0, 1, 1, u) gives
FY1(0,1)|D=0,M=1(h(0, 1, 1, u)) = FU |01(h
−1(0, 1, 1; h(0, 1, 1, u))) = FU |01(u).
Applying F−1
Y1(0,1)|D=0,M=1
(q) to both sides, we have
h(0, 1, 1, u) = F−1
Y1(0,1)|D=0,M=1
(FU |01(u)). (B.16)
Second, for FY0(0,1)|D=0,M=1(y) we obtain
F−1
U |01(FY0(0,1)|D=0,M=1(y)) = h
−1(0, 1, 1; y), (B.17)
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using (B.1). Combining (B.16) and (B.17) yields,
h(0, 1, 1, h−1(0, 1, 0; y)) = F−1
Y1(0,1)|D=0,M=1
◦ FY0(0,1)|D=0,M=1(y). (B.18)
The left sides of (B.15) and (B.18) are equal. In contrast to (B.15), (B.18)
contains only distributions that can be identified from observable data. In particular,
FYt(0,1)|D=0,M=1(y) = Pr(Yt(0, 1) ≤ y|D = 0,M = 1) = Pr(Yt ≤ y|D = 0,M =
1). Accordingly, we can identify F−1
Y1(0,1)|D=1,M=1
◦ FY0(0,1)|D=1,M=1(y) by Q01(y) ≡
F−1
Y1|D=0,M=1
◦ FY0|D=0,M=1(y).
Parsing Y0 through Q01(·) in the treated group with mediator gives
E[Q01(Y0)|D = 1,M = 1]
= E[F−1
Y1|D=0,M=1
◦ FY0|D=0,M=1(Y0)|D = 1,M = 1],
= E[F−1
Y1(0,1)|D=0,M=1
◦ FY0(0,1)|D=0,M=1(Y0(1, 1))|D = 1,M = 1],
A1,A5a
= E[h(0, 1, 1, h−1(0, 1, 0; Y0(1, 1)))|D = 1,M = 1],
A2
= E[h(0, 1, 1, h−1(0, 1, 0; Y0(0, 1)))|D = 1,M = 1],
A1,A5b
= E[F−1
Y1(0,1)|D=1,M=1
◦ FY0(0,1)|D=1,M=1(Y0(0, 1))|D = 1,M = 1],
= E[Y1(0, 1)|D = 1,M = 1] = E[Y1(0, 1)|D = 1,M(1) = 1],
(B.19)
which has data support under Assumption 6b.
B.4 Quantile direct effect under d = 1 conditional on D = 1
and M(1) = 1
In the following, we show that
θ
1,1
1 (q, 1) = F
−1
Y1(1,1)|D=1,M(1)=1
(q)− F−1
Y1(0,1)|D=1,M(1)=1
(q),
= F−1
Y1|D=1,M=1
(q)− F−1
Q01(Y0)|D=1,M=1
(q).
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For this purpose, we have to prove that
FY1(1,1)|D=1,M(1)=1(y) = FY1|D=1,M=1(y) and (B.20)
FY1(0,1)|D=1,M(1)=1(y) = FQ01(Y0)|D=1,M=1(y), (B.21)
which is sufficient to show that the quantiles are also identified. We can show (B.20)
using the observational rule FY1(1,1)|D=1,M(1)=1(y) = FY1|D=1,M=1(y) = E[1{Y1 ≤
y}|D = 1,M = 1].
Using (B.19), we obtain
FQ01(Y0)|D=1,M=1(y)
= E[1{Q01(Y0) ≤ y}|D = 1,M = 1],
= E[1{F−1
Y1|D=0,M=1
◦ FY0|D=0,M=1(Y0) ≤ y}|D = 1,M = 1],
= E[1{Y1(0, 1) ≤ y}|D = 1,M = 0],
= FY1(0,1)|D=1,M(1)=1(y),
which proves (B.21).
C Proof of equations (1) and (2)
∆1 = E[Y1|D = 1]−E[Y1|D = 0] and quantile treatment effect ∆1(q) = F−1Y1|D=1(q)−
F−1
Y1|D=0
(q)
The average total effect for the entire population is identified by,
∆1 = E[Y1(1,M(1))]− E[Y1(0,M(0))],
A7
= E[Y1(1,M(1))|D = 1]− E[Y1(0,M(0))|D = 0],
= E[Y1|D = 1]− E[Y1|D = 0],
where the first equality is the definition of ∆1, the second equality hold by Assump-
tion 7, and the last equality holds by the observational rule.
We define the conditional distribution FY1|D=d(y) = Pr(Y1 ≤ y|D = d) and
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F−1
Y1|D=d
(q) = inf{y : FY1|D=d(y) ≥ q}. We can show the identification of the total
QTE for the entire population ∆1(q) = F
−1
Y1|D=1
(q)− F−1
Y1|D=0
(q) when we show that
FY1(1,M(1))(y) = FY1|D=1(y) and FY1(0,M(0))(y) = FY1|D=0(y). Using Assumption 7 and
the observational rule gives,
FY1(1,M(1))(y) = Pr(Y1(1,M(1)) ≤ y),
A7
= Pr(Y1(1,M(1)) ≤ y|D = 1),
= Pr(Y1 ≤ y|D = 1) = FY1|D=1(y),
and
FY1(0,M(0))(y) = Pr(Y1(0,M(0)) ≤ y),
A7
= Pr(Y1(0,M(0)) ≤ y|D = 0),
= Pr(Y1 ≤ y|D = 0) = FY1|D=0(y),
which finishes the proof.
By Assumption 7, the share of a type τ conditional on D corresponds to pτ
(in the population), as D is randomly assigned. This implies that p1|1 = pa + pc,
p1|0 = pa + pde, p0|1 = pn + pde, and p0|0 = pn + pc. Under Assumption 8, pde = 0,
which finishes the proof of (1).
Furthermore, E[Yt(d,m)|τ,D = 1] = E[Yt(d,m)|τ,D = 0] = E[Yt(d,m)|τ ] due
to the independence ofD and the potential outcomes as well as the types τ (which are
a deterministic function of M(d)) under Assumption 7. It follows that conditioning
onD is not required on the right hand side of the following equation, which expresses
the mean outcome conditional D = 0 and M = 0 as weighted average of the mean
potential outcomes of compliers and never-takers:
E[Yt|D = 0,M = 0]
=
pn
pn + pc
E[Yt(0, 0)|τ = n] + pc
pn + pc
E[Yt(0, 0)|τ = c].
(C.1)
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Only compliers and never-takers satisfy M(0) = 0 and thus make up the group with
D = 0 and M = 0. After some rearrangements we obtain
E[Yt(0, 0)|τ = n]− E[Yt(0, 0)|τ = c]
=
pn + pc
pc
{E[Yt(0, 0)|τ = n]−E[Yt|D = 0,M = 0]} .
(C.2)
Next, we consider observations with D = 1 and M = 0, which might consist of both
never-takers and defiers, as M(1) = 0 for both types. However, by Assumption 8,
defiers are ruled out, such that the mean outcome given D1 = 1 and M1 = 0 is
determined by never-takers only:
E[Yt|D = 1,M = 0] A7,A8= E[Yt(1, 0)|τ = n]. (C.3)
Furthermore, by Assumption 2,
E[Y0(0, 0)|τ = n] A2= E[Y0(1, 0)|τ = n] A7,A8= E[Y0|D = 1,M = 0].
Similarly to (C.1) for the never-takers and compliers, consider the mean outcome
given Z = 1 and D = 1, which is made up by always-takers and compliers (the types
with M(1) = 1)
E[Yt|D = 1,M = 1]
=
pa
pa + pc
E[Yt(1, 1)|τ = a] + pc
pa + pc
E[Yt(1, 1)|τ = c].
(C.4)
After some rearrangements we obtain
E[Yt(1, 1)|τ = a]− E[Yt(1, 1)|τ = c]
=
pa + pc
pc
{E[Yt(1, 1)|τ = a]− E[Yt|D = 1,M = 1]} .
(C.5)
By Assumptions 7 and 8,
E[Yt|D = 0,M = 1] = E[Yt(0, 1)|τ = a]. (C.6)
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Now consider (C.5) for period T = 0, and note that by Assumption 2, E[Y0(1, 1)|τ =
a] = E[Y0(0, 0)|τ = a] = E[Y0(0, 1)|τ = a] and E[Y0(1, 1)|τ = c] = E[Y0(0, 0)|τ = c].
Combining (C.4), (C.6), and the law of iterative expectations (LIE) gives
E[Y0|D = 1]
LIE
= E[Y0|D = 1,M = 1] · p1|1 + E[Y0|D = 1,M = 0] · p0|1,
= E[Y0(1, 1)|τ = c] · pc + E[Y0(1, 1)|τ = a] · pa + E[Y0(1, 0)|τ = n] · pn,
A2
= E[Y0(1, 1)|τ = c] · pc + E[Y0(1, 1)|τ = a] · pa + E[Y0(0, 0)|τ = n] · pn.
Likewise, combining (C.1) and (C.3) gives
E[Y0|D = 0]
LIE
= E[Y0|D = 0,M = 1] · p1|0 + E[Y0|D0 = 1,M = 0] · p0|0,
= E[Y0(0, 1)|τ = a] · pa + E[Y0(0, 0)|τ = c] · pc + E[Y0(0, 0)|τ = n] · pn,
A2
= E[Y0(1, 1)|τ = a] · pa + E[Y0(0, 0)|τ = c] · pc + E[Y0(0, 0)|τ = n] · pn.
Accordingly,
E[Y0|D = 1]−E[Y0|D = 0]
p1|1 − p1|0 = E[Y0(1, 1)|τ = c]− E[Y0(0, 0)|τ = c]
A2
= 0,
which proves (2). Accordingly, E[Y0|D = 1] − E[Y0|D = 0] = 0 is a testable
implication of Assumption 2, 7, and 8.
D Proof of Theorem 3
D.1 Average direct effect on the never-takers
In the following, we show that θn1 = E[Y1(1, 0)−Y1(0, 0)|τ = n] = E[Y1−Q00(Y0)|D =
1,M = 0]. From (C.3), we obtain the first ingredient E[Y1(1, 0)|τ = n] = E[Y1|D =
1,M = 0]. Furthermore, from (A.9) we have E[Q00(Y0)|D = 1,M = 0] = E[Y1(0, 0)|D =
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1,M(1) = 0]. Under Assumption 7 and 8,
E[Y1(0, 0)|D = 1,M(1) = 0] A7= E[Y1(0, 0)|D = 1, τ = n]
A8
= E[Y1(0, 0)|τ = n].
(D.1)
D.2 Quantile direct effect on the never-takers
We prove that
θn1 (q) = F
−1
Y1(1,0)|τ=n
(q)− F−1
Y1(0,0)|τ=n
(q),
= F−1
Y1|D=1,M=0
(q)− F−1
Q00(Y0)|D=1,M=0
(q).
This requires showing that
FY1(1,0)|τ=n(y) = FY1|D=1,M=0(y) and (D.2)
FY1(0,0)|τ=n(y) = FQ00(Y0)|D=1,M=0(y). (D.3)
Under Assumptions 7 and 8,
FYt|D=1,M=0(y) = E[1{Yt ≤ y}|D = 1,M = 0]
A7,A8
= E[1{Yt(1, 0) ≤ y}|τ = n]
= FYt(1,0)|τ=n(y),
(D.4)
which proves (D.2). From (A.12), we have
FQ00(Y0)|D=1,M=0(y) = FY1(0,0)|D=1,M(1)=0(y) = E[1{Y1(0, 0) ≤ y}|D = 1,M(1) = 0].
Under Assumption 7 and 8,
E[1{Y1(0, 0) ≤ y}|D = 1,M(1) = 0] A7,A8= E[1{Y1(0, 0) ≤ y}|τ = n]
= FY1(0,0)|τ=n(y),
(D.5)
which proves (D.3).
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D.3 Average direct effect under d = 0 on compliers
In the following, we show that
θc1(0) =E[Y1(1, 0)− Y1(0, 0)|τ = c],
=
p0|0
p0|0 − p0|1E[Q10(Y0)− Y1|D = 0,M = 0]
− p0|1
p0|0 − p0|1E[Y1 −Q00(Y0)|D = 1,M = 0].
Plugging (D.1) in (C.1) under T = 1, we obtain
E[Y1|D = 0,M = 0] = pn
pn + pc
E[Q00(Y0)|D = 1,M = 0]
+
pc
pn + pc
E[Y1(0, 0)|τ = c].
This allows identifying
E[Y1(0, 0)|τ = c] =
p0|0
p0|0 − p0|1E[Y1|D = 0,M = 0]
− p0|1
p0|0 − p0|1E[Q00(Y0)|D = 1,M = 0].
(D.6)
Accordingly, we have to show the identification of E[Y1(1, 0)|c] to finish the
proof. From (A.19) we have E[Y1(1, 0)|D = 0,M = 0] = E[Q10(Y0)|D = 0,M = 0].
Applying the law of iterative expectations, gives
E[Y1(1, 0)|D = 0,M = 0] = pn
pn + pc
E[Y1(1, 0)|D = 0,M = 0, τ = n]
+
pc
pn + pc
E[Y1(1, 0)|D = 0,M = 0, τ = c],
A7
=
pn
pn + pc
E[Y1(1, 0)|τ = n] + pc
pn + pc
E[Y1(1, 0)|τ = c].
After some rearrangements and using (C.3), we obtain
E[Y1(1, 0)|τ = c] = pn + pc
pc
E[Q10(Y0)|D = 0,M = 0]− pn
pc
E[Y1|D = 1,M = 0].
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This gives
E[Y1(1, 0)|τ = c] =
p0|0
p0|0 − p0|1E[Q10(Y0)|D = 0,M = 0]
− p0|1
p0|0 − p0|1E[Y1|D = 1,M = 0],
(D.7)
using pn = p0|1, and pc + pn = p0|0.
D.4 Quantile direct effect under d = 0 on compliers
We show that
FY1(1,0)|τ=c(y) =
p0|0
p0|0 − p0|1FQ10(Y0)|D=0,M=0(y)−
p0|1
p0|0 − p0|1cFY1|D=1,M=0(y) and
FY1(0,0)|τ=c(y) =
p0|0
p0|0 − p0|1FY1|D=0,M=0(y)−
p0|1
p0|0 − p0|1FQ00(Y0)|D=1,M=0(y),
which proves that θc1(q, 0) = F
−1
Y1(1,0)|c
(q)− F−1
Y1(0,0)|c
(q) is identified.
From (A.20), we have FY1(1,0)|D=0,M(0)=0(y) = FQ10(Y0)|D=0,M=0(y). Applying the
law of iterative expectations gives
FY1(1,0)|D=0,M(0)=0(y) =
pn
pn + pc
FY1(1,0)|D=0,M(0)=0,τ=n(y)
+
pc
pn + pc
FY1(1,0)|D=0,M(0)=0,τ=c(y),
A7
=
pn
pn + pc
FY1(1,0)|τ=n(y) +
pc
pn + pc
FY1(1,0)|τ=c(y).
Using (D.2) and rearranging the equation gives,
FY1(1,0)|τ=c(y) =
p0|0
p0|0 − p0|1FQ10(Y0)|D=0,M=0(y)−
p0|1
p0|0 − p0|1FY1|D=1,M=0(y). (D.8)
In analogy to (C.1), the outcome distribution under D = 0 and M = 0 equals:
FY1|D=0,M=0(y) =
pn
pn + pc
FY1(0,0)|τ=n(y) +
pc
pn + pc
FY1(0,0)|τ=c(y).
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Using (D.3) and rearranging the equation gives
FY1(0,0)|τ=c(y) =
p0|0
p0|0 − p0|1FY1|D=0,M=0(y)−
p0|1
p0|0 − p0|1FQ00(Y0)|D=1,M=0(y). (D.9)
E Proof of Theorem 4
E.1 Average direct effect on the always-takers
In the following, we show that θa1 = E[Y1(1, 1) − Y1(0, 1)|τ = a] = E[Q11(Y0) −
Y1|D = 0,M = 1]. From (C.6), we obtain the first ingredient E[Y1(0, 1)|a] =
E[Y1|D = 0,M = 1]. Furthermore, from (B.9) we have E[Q11(Y0)|D = 0,M = 1] =
E[Y1(1, 1)|D = 0,M(0) = 1]. Under Assumption 7 and 8,
E[Y1(1, 1)|D = 0,M(0) = 1] A7= E[Y1(1, 1)|D = 0, τ = a]
A8
= E[Y1(1, 1)|τ = a].
(E.1)
E.2 Quantile direct effect on the always-takers
We prove that
θa1(q) = F
−1
Y1(1,1)|τ=a
(q)− F−1
Y1(0,1)|τ=a
(q),
= F−1
Q11(Y0)|D=0,M=1
(q)− F−1
Y1|D=0,M=1
(q).
This requires showing that
FY1(1,1)|τ=a(y) = FQ11(Y0)|D=0,M=1(y) and (E.2)
FY1(0,1)|τ=a(y) = FY1|D=0,M=1(y). (E.3)
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Under Assumptions 7 and 8,
FYt|D=0,M=1(y) = E[1{Yt ≤ y}|D = 0,M = 1]
A7,A8
= E[1{Yt(0, 1) ≤ y}|τ = a]
= FYt(0,1)|τ=a, (y).
(E.4)
which proves (E.3). From (B.12), we have
FQ11(Y0)|D=0,M=1(y) = FY1(1,1)|D=0,M(0)=1(y) = E[1{Y1(1, 1) ≤ y}|D = 0,M(0) = 1].
Under Assumption 7 and 8,
E[1{Y1(1, 1) ≤ y}|D = 0,M(0) = 1] A7,A8= E[1{Y1(1, 1) ≤ y}|τ = a]
= FY1(1,1)|τ=a(y),
(E.5)
which proves (E.2).
E.3 Average direct effect under d = 1 on compliers
In the following, we show that
θc1(1) =E[Y1(1, 1)− Y1(0, 1)|τ = c],
=
p1|1
p1|1 − p1|0E[Y1 −Q01(Y0)|D = 1,M = 1]
− p1|0
p1|1 − p1|0E[Q11(Y0)− Y1|D = 0,M = 1].
Plugging (E.1) in (C.4), we obtain
E[Y1|D = 1,M = 1] = pa
pa + pc
E[Q11(Y0)|D = 0,M = 1]
+
pc
pa + pc
E[Y1(1, 1)|τ = c].
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This allows identifying
E[Y1(1, 1)|τ = c] =
p1|1
p1|1 − p1|0E[Y1|D = 1,M = 1]
− p1|0
p1|1 − p1|0E[Q11(Y0)|D = 0,M = 1].
(E.6)
From (B.19) we have E[Y1(0, 1)|D = 1,M = 1] = E[Q01(Y0)|D = 1,M = 1].
Applying the law of iterative expectations, gives
E[Y1(0, 1)|D = 1,M = 1] = pa
pa + pc
E[Y1(0, 1)|D = 1,M = 1, τ = a]
+
pc
pa + pc
E[Y1(0, 1)|D = 1,M = 1, τ = c],
A7
=
pa
pa + pc
E[Y1(0, 1)|τ = a] + pc
pa + pc
E[Y1(0, 1)|τ = c].
After some rearrangements and using (C.6), we obtain
E[Y1(0, 1)|τ = c] = pa + pc
pc
E[Q01(Y0)|D = 1,M = 1]− pa
pc
E[Y1|D = 0,M = 1].
This gives
E[Y1(0, 1)|τ = c] =
p1|1
p1|1 − p1|0E[Q01(Y0)|D = 1,M = 1]
− p1|0
p1|1 − p1|0E[Y1|D = 0,M = 1],
(E.7)
with pa = p1|0, and pc + pa = p1|1.
E.4 Quantile direct effect under d = 1 on compliers
We show that
FY1(1,1)|τ=c(y) =
p1|1
p1|1 − p1|0FY1|D=1,M=1(y)−
p1|0
p1|1 − p1|0FQ11(Y0)|D=0,M=1(y) and
FY1(0,1)|τ=c(y) =
p1|1
p1|1 − p1|0FQ01(Y0)|D=1,M=1(y)−
p1|0
p1|1 − p1|0FY1|D=0,M=1(y),
which proves that θc1(q, 1) = F
−1
Y1(1,1)|c
(q)− F−1
Y1(0,1)|c
(q) is identified.
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In analogy to (C.4), the outcome distribution under D = 0 and M = 0 equals:
FY1|D=1,M=1(y) =
pa
pa + pc
FY1(1,1)|τ=a(y) +
pc
pa + pc
FY1(1,1)|τ=c(y).
Using (E.2) and rearranging the equation gives
FY1(1,1)|τ=c(y) =
p1|1
p1|1 − p1|0FY1|D=1,M=1(y)−
p1|0
p1|1 − p1|0FQ11(Y0)|D=0,M=1(y). (E.8)
From (B.21), we have FY1(0,1)|D=1,M(1)=1(y) = FQ01(Y0)|D=1,M=1(y). Applying the
law of iterative expectations gives
FY1(0,1)|D=1,M(1)=1(y) =
pa
pa + pc
FY1(0,1)|D=1,M(1)=1,τ=a(y)
+
pc
pa + pc
FY1(0,1)|D=1,M(1)=1,τ=c(y),
A7
=
pa
pa + pc
FY1(0,1)|τ=a(y) +
pc
pa + pc
FY1(0,1)|τ=c(y).
Using (E.3) and rearranging the equation gives,
FY1(0,1)|τ=c(y) =
p1|1
p1|1 − p1|0FQ01(Y0)|D=1,M=1(y)−
p1|0
p1|1 − p1|0FY1|D=0,M=1(y). (E.9)
F Proof of Theorem 5
F.1 Average treatment effect on the compliers
In (E.6) and (D.6), we show that
θc1 =E[Y1(1, 1)− Y1(0, 0)|τ = c],
=
p1|1
p1|1 − p1|0E[Y1|D = 1,M = 1]−
p1|0
p1|1 − p1|0E[Q11(Y0)|D = 0,M = 1]
− p0|0
p0|0 − p0|1E[Y1|D = 0,M = 0] +
p0|1
p0|0 − p0|1E[Q00(Y0)|D = 1,M = 0].
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F.2 Quantile treatment effect on the compliers
In (E.8) and (D.9), we show that FY1(1,1)|c(y) and FY1(0,0)|c(y) are identified. Accord-
ingly, ∆c1(q) = F
−1
Y1(1,1)|c
(q)− F−1
Y1(0,0)|c
(q) is identified.
F.3 Average indirect effect under d = 0 on compliers
In (E.7) and (D.6), we show that
δc1(0) =E[Y1(0, 1)− Y1(0, 0)|τ = c],
=
p1|1
p1|1 − p1|0E[Q01(Y0)|D = 1,M = 1]−
p1|0
p1|1 − p1|0E[Y1|D = 0,M = 1]
− p0|0
p0|0 − p0|1E[Y1|D = 0,M = 0] +
p0|1
p0|0 − p0|1E[Q00(Y0)|D = 1,M = 0].
F.4 Quantile indirect effect under d = 0 on compliers
In (E.9) and (D.9), we show that FY1(0,1)|c(y) and FY1(0,0)|c(y) are identified. Accord-
ingly, δc1(q, 0) = F
−1
Y1(0,1)|c
(q)− F−1
Y1(0,0)|c
(q) is identified.
F.5 Average indirect effect under d = 1 on compliers
In (E.6) and (D.7), we show that
δc1(1) =E[Y1(1, 1)− Y1(1, 0)|τ = c],
=
p1|1
p1|1 − p1|0E[Y1|D = 1,M = 1]−
p1|0
p1|1 − p1|0E[Q11(Y0)|D = 0,M = 1]
− p0|0
p0|0 − p0|1E[Q10(Y0)|D = 0,M = 0] +
p0|1
p0|0 − p0|1E[Y1|D = 1,M = 0].
F.6 Quantile indirect effect under d = 1 on compliers
In (E.8) and (D.8), we show that FY1(1,1)|c(y) and FY1(1,0)|c(y) are identified. Accord-
ingly, δc1(q, 1) = F
−1
Y1(1,1)|c
(q)− F−1
Y1(1,0)|c
(q) is identified.
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